Summary
Monetary policy directly affects the shortest interest rates in the market. But if market participants are forward looking, then their expectations of future policy actions -and hence future short-term interest rates -will affect longer-term rates. This is a crucial aspect of the transmission of monetary policy. If monetary policy is stable and well understood, then market participants might be able to anticipate future policy decisions. Consequently, we would expect market interest rates to contain information about future policy rate changes.
In this paper, we examine whether the ability of UK market interest rates to predict future policy rate changes has changed markedly over the period . Such improvements in predictability could arise from greater transparency in the monetary policy process, together with greater credibility of the Bank of England. Greater transparency allows market participants to anticipate future policy rate decisions with a greater degree of accuracy. Transparency can also enhance the central bank's credibility. Indeed, clear communication of its policy objectives and its decision making process are likely to strenghten public confidence in the central bank's ability to deliver its objective of stable inflation, thereby consolidating inflation expectations. Since financial market participants form views of future interest rate changes that reflect future expected policy rate changes required to achieve this price stability, stable inflation expectations are likely to contribute to policy rate predictability So this is another way in which transparency affects predictability.
Empirically, we can test the degree to which market rates anticipate future policy rate changes by examining the dynamic relationship between market and policy rate changes. In the United States, researchers have found evidence of predictability at the shortest end of the yield curve, although they also show that this predictability holds over very short horizons only. Recent work by Lange, Sack and Whitesell (2003) and Swanson (2003) has revealed that predictability varies over time.
These studies show that since the mid 1990s, market rates have become better predictors of Fed policy changes, and that the predictability horizon has lengthened. While the authors admit that this shift cannot be attributed to a single factor, they cite the improved transparency of the Fed's monetary policy as a key factor in improving market participants' ability to anticipate future policy rate changes.
In this paper, we conduct a similar analysis for UK rates in the period . During this period, the monetary framework changed from (albeit not pure) monetary targeting (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) to (various forms of) exchange rate targeting (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) and since 1992, inflation rate targeting. In addition, monetary policy has become more transparent, with the introduction of scheduled meetings to discuss policy rate changes (October 1992) , the publication of the Inflation Report (February 1993 ) the decision to publish the minutes of the monthly interest rate meetings (April 1994 ) and the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee (May 1997).
We start by estimating a simple term structure model and introduce exogenous breakpoints corresponding to the key policy changes. The results of this analysis indicate that predictability has improved over time, and most notably after the introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992. But closer inspection of the data reveals that predictability did not rise linearly, nor is it possible to generalise this result across maturities. For example, at the longest horizon, it rose briefly after the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980 and plummeted after the suspension of ERM membership in September 1992. Rolling regressions show that in the 1980s and early 1990s predictability fluctuated between 0 and 60%, with frequent highs and lows seemingly unrelated to any policy changes.
Finally, we formally test for the presence of structural breaks in the term structure model without using any prior information on the location of potential breaks. This is done by employing the recently developed methodology of Bai and Perron. Unfortunately, this exercise was on the whole unsuccessful, as the tests did generally not identify the earlier-used exogenous breakpoints. We attribute this result to either the unknown power properties of the Bai and Perron methodology, and/or to misspecification of the term structure model.
In spite of this mixed evidence, we nonetheless conclude that, over the longer sample period, the data show a clear improvement in the ability of market participants to predict policy rate changes by the Bank of England.
Introduction
Monetary policy directly affects the shortest interest rates in the market. But if market participants are forward looking, then their expectations of future policy actions -and hence future short-term interest rates-will affect longer-term rates. This is a crucial aspect of the transmission of monetary policy. If monetary policy is stable and well understood, then market participants might be able to anticipate future policy decisions. Consequently, we would expect market interest rates to contain information about future policy rate changes.
Empirically, we can test the degree to which market rates anticipate future policy rate changes by examining the dynamic relationship between market and policy rate changes. In the United States, researchers have found evidence of predictability at the shortest end of the yield curve, although they also show that this predictability holds over very short horizons only. Recent work by Lange et al. (2003) and Swanson (2003) has revealed that predictability varies over time. Both studies show that since the mid 1990s, market rates have become better predictors of Fed policy changes, and that the predictability horizon has lengthened. In this paper, we conduct a similar analysis for UK rates in the period . Given that our data set covers a long period, during which monetary policy underwent significant changes, we would not expect the relationship between market and policy rates to stay the same over time. For this reason, we will be particularly interested in the outcome of structural breakpoint tests.
Predictability of policy rate changes is not inconsistent with optimal monetary policy. In the next section, we first review the theory and describe the factors that can be expected to contribute to predictability. Section 3 outlines the empirical model employed in the paper and section 4 surveys the empirical literature on predictability of monetary policy. The data set is presented in section 5, and empirical results are available in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Monetary policy and predictability
In most developed countries, central banks conduct their monetary policy either by targeting a short-term market interest rate or by setting an official interest rate for their open market operations. These policy rates anchor the entire term structure of interest rates. At very short maturities, monetary policy directly affects market interest rates via normal arbitrage mechanisms.
At longer maturities, monetary policy has a more indirect effect since market interest rates depend on market participants' expectations of future policy rate changes. This means that one can study market interest rates and their ability to predict future policy rate changes. One can also assess whether this predictability changes over time, when either markets or monetary policy have undergone important changes.
One view of monetary policy is that if shocks arrive in a random fashion, the optimal policy response is equally unanticipated, and policy rates will be unpredictable. Yet at the same time, one frequently observes that central banks implement monetary policy via a succession of small rate changes in the same direction (see e.g. Rudebusch (2002)). Hence, an alternative view is that central banks adjust policy rates slowly towards their desired target. Empirical work on policy rules further shows that this adjustment make take several quarters (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) ). This so-called monetary policy inertia is attributed to either central banks's preference for interest rate smoothing, or their slow response to new information.
But recent research in the United States and the United Kingdom has demonstrated that such interest rate smoothing (also refered to as gradualism) might constitute an optimal response to shocks hitting the economy if economic agents are forward-looking.
(1) Woodford (1999) argues that if a central bank has established a reputation for either keeping rates at the same level for an extended period of time, or for implementing successive, small changes after an initial move, it effectively has committed itself to a path of future short rates. Market participants will incorporate these beliefs into their expectations of future short-term rates, and longer-term rates will reflect the central bank's expected future policy rate changes. In other words, Woodford (1999) shows that it is optimal for the central bank to commit to inertia. This has two implications. First, the central bank will be able to achieve its long-term objective (of e.g. price stability) without excessive short-term interest rate volatility, and second, market interest rates will contain information about future policy rates. Goodfriend (1998) refers to this as 'policy in the pipeline,' and argues that if the market correctly anticipates future policy decisions, then future policy changes are reflected in market interest rates before being implemented by the central bank.
This is because market interest rates will not only reflect the first policy rate change, but also the sequence of expected future rate changes in the same direction.
(1) See for example Sack (1998b) and Sack (1998a understanding, openness will not be sufficient for transparency.
Greater transparency allows market participants to anticipate future policy rate decisions with a greater degree of accuracy. In that sense, transparency leads to predictability. It is generally accepted, however, that neither full transparency nor full predictability can be attained in a world of uncertainty. While central banks prefer to avoid surprises (King (1997)), Vickers (1998) acknowledges that monetary policy 'cannot be absolutely transparent, nor totally boring' as monetary policy is a highly complex decision making process, particularly when decisions are made collectively.
Transparency can also enhance the central bank's credibility. Indeed, clear communication of its policy objectives and its decision making process are likely to strenghten public confidence in the central bank's ability to deliver its objective of stable inflation, thereby consolidating inflation expectations. Since financial market participants form views of future interest rate changes that reflect future expected policy rate changes required to achieve this price stability, stable inflation expectations are likely to contribute to policy rate predictability So this is another way in which transparency affects predictability.
But increased predictability could also be the result of changes in the dynamic structure of the economy. If shocks hitting the economy have become more persistent (or serially correlated) over time, then the central bank's response to these shocks is likely to have become more persistent as
well. This in turn would increase the predictability of policy rate changes, in much the same way as our earlier discussion of gradualism outlined. Empirically, however, it is difficult to distinguish between gradualism and serial correlation, see Rudebusch (2002) . Goodhart (1999) , however,
suggests that the degree of gradualism in monetary policy is higher than the possible serial correlation of shocks to the economy. Model simulations by Sack (1998a) indicate that the observed Fed policy cannot be explained by the dynamic behaviour of the economic shocks that enters its policy function.
(2) Martin (1999) and Martin and Salmon (1999) further show that gradualism might also constitute an optimal response to economic shocks when central banks are uncertain about key economic relationships. Since this uncertainty affects the economic models central banks employ when considering their policy decisions, the research, initiated by Brainard (1967), indicates that it might be optimal for policy rates to be changed in a smoother way than in the certainty-case.
In the United Kingdom, the monetary policy framework has undergone important changes in the past three decades. These changes, outlined below strategy, a monetary target range was set over a medium-term horizon (four years), and all other macroeconomic policies were subordinated to the achievement of this target. Goodhart (1989b) writes that 'the terms in which the Chancellor described his adherence to the £3M target implied an unprecedented degree of commitment.' Nonetheless, monetary policy continued to be dominated by other policy considerations (e.g. concerns with a rising exchange rate after 1979 and with domestic credit expansion in 1982-5) and official interests were raised sharply several times, to reach a peak of 17% in November 1979. The introduction of additional targets in March 1982
further undermined the public's confidence in the monetary authorities' commitment to monetary targeting. The £M3 target was officially abandoned in October 1985.
(2) Within the framework employed in the present paper, it is not possible to disentangle these factors, and neither does Lange et al. (2003) .
(3) For more detail, see Fforde (1983) , Coleby (1983) , Goodhart (1989a) , Goodhart (1989b) , Minford (1993) and Nelson (2000) .
After the formal suspension of the £M3 target, and in light of the instability in foreign exchange rate markets experienced during the early 1980s, monetary policy in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, was increasingly conducted with an eye on stabilising exchange rate movements. were implemented, of which only 6 constituted a change in direction. This is consistent with the increased gradualism in UK monetary policy discussed earlier.
To conclude, data on official rates suggest that the pattern of interest rate setting by the UK authorities has changed over time. In the next section, we outline an empirical model that allows us to quantify whether this has led to increased predictability in market interest rates.
Methodology
To explore whether the ability of financial markets to predict future interest rates has changed over time, we first need to define how to extract expectations of future interest rates from market interest rates and second decide on how to evaluate the performance of these expectations. That is the purpose of sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Extracting expectations from financial markets
Various financial markets embed market participants' expectations of future interest rates. We choose to focus on the Libor market because data span a long period, it is very liquid, and it is dominated by major international banks so credit risk is relatively low. To extract market expectations, we need a term structure model. The most commonly used is based on the Expectations Hypothesis (EH).
(5) In its simplest form, the EH states that the interest rate of a long-dated bond (denoted by y n,t ) equals the average of current and future expected short-term rates (short term rate is denoted by y m,t ) over the holding period of the long bond . To see how this model is derived, we construct a simple example that compares two investment strategies from day t to day t+1 in the bond market. The first strategy consists of buying a one-day bond. This is a safe strategy, with return given by y 1,t .
(6) In the second strategy, we buy an n-day bond today and sell it at the beginning of tomorrow. In contrast to the first strategy, this is an uncertain or risky strategy because we don't know its future cash flow (the price of an (n-1)-day bond tomorrow morning). The expected return on this investment is given by E t r n,t+1 . In a risk-neutral setup, the two investment strategies of our example yield the same expected returns. But, standard asset (5) Although no longer at the frontier of term structure modeling, the expectations hypothesis remains one of the most popular models for thinking about interest rate expectations by both policy makers (see e.g. Brooke, Cooper and Scholtes (2000)) and academics (see e.g. Cochrane (2001) ).
(6) We define the holding period return on an n-period bond purchased at time t and sold at time t + 1 as r n,t+1 . We use log returns, or in other words, we adopt continuous compounding.
pricing theory augments the return on the one-day bond with a risk premium γ n,t , see eg.
Campbell and Shiller (1991).
This risk or term premium compensates the investor for the risk associated with the riskier strategy (which as said earlier has an unknown future pay-off). Equation (1) produces the log Expectations Hypothesis, if one restricts the risk premium η n,t to be time-invariant:
It can be shown that equation (2) can be rewritten as
where
is the spread between the n-day yield and the m-day yield, and
measures future changes in the short rate y m,t .
Equation (3) states that the spread between the n-period yield (y n,t ) and the m-period yield (y m,t ) equals a weighted average of expected future changes in the short-term rate (y m,t ) plus a constant (γ n,m ). It is easy to show that γ n,m is a linear combination of various risk premia if the log Expectations Hypothesis holds (9) . The intuition of this equation is that if the yield on the long bond, y n,t is higher than the yield on the short period bond y m,t , short rates are expected to rise so that the average short rate over the life of the long bond equals the initial long-bond yield. Since the EH applies to any combination of long and short rates, we can take the policy rate as our short rate (y m,t ).
(10) Equation (3) can then be used to examine whether the spread of a given market rate over the official rate (c (n,m),t ) has predictive power for future official rates (y m,t+i ).
In the context of the United Kingdom, the official rate is approximately a two-week interest rate, so m = 14. To ease notation, we therefore rewrite equation (3), dropping subscripts m s n,t = E t c n,t + γ n , n 14 is an integer value (6) (7) See eg. Campbell and Shiller (1991) . (8) Derivations are available upon request.
(9) see eg. Chapter 10 in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) .
(10) By mixing Libor rates (unsecured lending) and policy rates (secured lending), we introduce an additional factor of credit risk into the risk premium, γ n,m , in equation (3). However, the effect of this distortion is likely to be minimal.
Empirical work often rejects the log Expectations Hypothesis. There are various econometric and economic explanations of this finding which will not be covered in detail here, see eg Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997), Campbell and Shiller (1991) , and Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) . For the purpose of this paper, the implication is that market expectations can not be extracted by re-arranging equation (6) to E t c n,t = s n,t − γ n , because this formulation of market expectations is mis-specified. But how then are market expectations formed ?
According to (Campbell and Shiller, 1991, p. 512-512 ) the risk-premium γ n in (6) is mis-specified in the sense that it is not correlated with expected increases in the short rates. Similarly, Thornton (2002) claims that the risk-premium γ n in (6) is mis-specified because it does not depend linearly on the long rate y n,t . The essence of these explanations is that rejection of the log Expectations
Hypothesis is due to mis-specification of the risk-premium because it is not specified as a linear function of the yield spread s n,t , (Campbell and Shiller (1991)) or the long rate y n,t , (Thornton (2002)).
These conjectures are consistent with a growing literature on yield curve modelling stressing the importance of time-varying risk premia. In what follows, we adopt Campbell and Shiller (1991)'s suggestion and modify equation (6) by redefining the constant term γ n as an affine function of the slope of the yield curve
Rewriting (9) to get an expression for expected future changes in the short rate
The interpretation of equation (11) is that market expectations of future changes in the short rate can be expressed as an affine function of the yield spread. ((Campbell and Shiller, 1991, p. 513)) refer to this model as an overreaction model of the yield spread. The log Expectations Hypothesis is obtained as a special case where the population value of β is unity and therefore δ n is zero because the term premium must be time-invariant. Empirical estimates of equation (11) are obtained by regressing actual changes in the short rate c n,t on the spread s n,t and a constant:
is an integer value (12)
So according to the model, estimates of market expectations are given by fitted values, c n,t , from the linear regression model in (12).
The error term u n,t contains an expectation error, which will be uncorrelated with the yield spread s n,t under the assumption of rational expectations. Furthermore, as can be seen from equation (12), if the time span between adjacent data points is higher than n, the maturity of the long bond, then the regression will involve overlapping errors, and u n,t will be serially correlated (see Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Hodrick (1992)).
Evaluation of market expectations
The former section explained how to extract estimates of market expectations. In this section, we explore how to evaluate the performance of these expectations.
A common approach in forecast evaluation is to use a loss function L( c n,t , c n,t ), which must obviously be a function of the expected value c n,t and the outcome c n,t . By far the most common loss function adopted in statistics is a quadratic loss function
An estimator of the expected loss from a given set of forecasts c n,t is then given by the mean squared error criterion
2 T In some cases, this quantity is expressed in term of the root-mean-square-error R M S E = ( c n,t − c n,t ) 2 T Note that c n,t − c n,t = u n,t , so the estimator of σ u n , the standard error of u n,t ,
T is identical to the RMSE criterion. Hence, we adopt σ u n as a goodness-of-fit measure for the market expectations c n,t . A low σ u n is associated with a low average loss.
An alternative performance measure is given by the coefficient of determination R 2 from the regression in (12). It describes how large a fraction of the variation in c n,t is explained by c n,t .
Obviously, a high R 2 indicates that the market is good at predicting future changes in the short rate c n,t .
One could argue that the quadratic loss function used above does not provide a realistic representation of market participants' loss function. Alternatively, we adopt the linlin loss function
used by Granger (1969) . One motivation for this loss function is that it is asymmetric in losses, in the sense that positive and negative forecast errors of the same magnitude do not give rise to equal losses. (11) An estimator of the expected loss from a given set of forecasts c n,t is then given by the mean linlin loss
T with parameters a and b. It is easy to show that the M L L criterion is linear in (a, b), so without loss of generality we normalize a = 1, and the criterion reduces to
is associated with a low loss and thereby a high degree of predictability. (12) One could argue that in the presence of a linlin loss function, the conditional mean, which is going to be used as the predictor of this paper (embodied in OLS regressions) is inadequate, as shown by Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) . Instead the quantile regression approach would be suitable because the underlying loss function is linlin. However, we abstract from this interesting extension of the paper due to limitations of space.
Existing empirical evidence
Previous work on the predictability of short-term interest rates has tended to focus on the United States. The earlier literature (see e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Rudebusch (1995)) concluded that only the short end of the Treasury yield curve contained information for future policy rate decisions. Moreover, the predictability of short rates was found to improve with the length of the forecast horizon. In contrast, at longer maturities, such predictability was found to be largely absent.
More recent work has documented the time-varying nature of this short-term predictability. For example, Lange et al. (2003) find that throughout the 1980s, market interest rates had predictive power for policy rate changes only one month ahead. But, from the late 1980s onwards, predictability improved significantly. In particular, from the mid 1990s onwards, market rates are found to forecast up to 70% of policy changes several months ahead. While the authors admit that this shift cannot be attributed to a single factor, they cite the improved transparency of the Fed's monetary policy (13) as a key factor in improving market participants' ability to anticipate future policy rate changes. Using a very similar methodology, Swanson (2003) finds that predictability has deteriorated since January 2001. The author attributes this to increased variability in the Fed's policy rate, January 2001 being the start of its most recent easing cycle. For the past two decades as a whole, the trend towards improved forecast accuracy is robust though, even after controlling for policy rate variability and macroeconomic uncertainty. Lange et al. (2003) also test the predictive ability of futures contracts, using the term structure method described in the previous section. In particular, they examine federal funds futures, which offer a payout based on the average federal funds rate over a particular month. In addition, these contracts are used to construct a measure of the unexpected component of Fed policy
decisions. This 'policy surprise' was first introduced by Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) . The analysis by Lange et al. (2003) reveals that the predictive ability of futures contracts has increased over time, with the federal funds contract explaining around 80% of the change in actual policy rate changes from the mid 1990s onwards. This increase in predictive ability is shown to coincide with a decline in the unanticipated component of monetary policy, as measured by the policy surprise statistic.
(13) e.g the issue of a statement that includes the federal funds target after Febraury 1994.
Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) conduct a similar analysis for the euro area. Policy surprises are measured using principal component analysis for a range of short-term interest rates. They report that more than 80% of ECB policy decisions between 1999 and 2002 had been anticipated by the markets. Repeating this exercise for the United States (using the same sample period), they find that 73% of all FOMC policy decisions were anticipated.
Empirical evidence for the United Kingdom is relatively sparse. Haldane and Read (2000) document the impact of policy rate changes on the UK forward yield curve between 1984 and 1997. They find that about half of policy rate changes are anticipated at the short end. At the long end, they document a greater degree of predictability. Finally, they report that predictability increased after the introduction of the inflation target in October 1992, with the impact of surprises changes falling to about 25% at the short end. Cross-country analysis for the period 1990-1997 by the same authors reveals greater predictability of US and German monetary policy, and lower predictability in Italy and the United Kingdom. The authors attribute this to differences in credibility of the respective central banks and related, to differences in the stability of inflationary expectations.
In a separate strand of the literature, Clare and Courtenay (2001) and Lasaosa (2003) , examine the reaction of market interest rates to both macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy decisions. If monetary policy has become more transparent over time, then we would expect market rates to react more to the former, and less to the latter. The event studies, using UK data for the period 1994-1999 and 1994-2001 , respectively, failed to confirm this hypothesis.
Data
Equation ( and West (1987) . These corrections, however, do not work well when the degree of serial correlation is large relative to the sample size, see Hodrick (1992) . Also, the breakpoint methodology of section 6.4 does not seem to work well in the presence of serial correlation in the error terms, see Bai and Perron (2001) . For these reasons, we transform the data set of daily observations into a data set of beginning-of-month observations. (16) In other words, equations (15)-(18) are implemented by use of monthly data. In doing so, we reduce the amount of serial correlation in the error terms u n,t of (12) relative to using daily observations. However, under the assumption of the model in equations ( Before implementing these regressions, it is worth having a preliminary look at the data. cases, the two variables appear to move closely together in the last third of the sample only.
Empirical results

Estimation of market expectations
Estimates of equations (15)-(18) with Newey-West standard errors in brackets are shown in Table   B . Note that the effective sample periods differ because of the construction of c n,t , see equation
(8).
According to the log Expectations Hypothesis β i should equal unity. However, the β i 's in Table B, except for β 182 differ significantly from unity, rejecting the hypothesis at a 5 % significance level.
This empirical rejection of the log Expectations Hypothesis is a well-documented result, and has been ascribed to a number of factors. First, it is argued that if the risk premium is time-varying, then equation (12) is not correctly specified. Campbell, Shiller and Schoenholtz (1983) suggest that failure to incorporate this time variation into the regression equation could explain the empirical rejection of the log Expectations Hypothesis. This is precisely the motivation for accounting for a time-varying risk premium as reflected in the model described in section 3.1.
(16) Specifically, we pick data for the first of each month. If this data point does not exist, eg because the day was in a weekend, we pick data for the last business day of the preceding month.
Second, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) provide an alternative explanation. They argue that the empirical model given by equation ( (12) is not necessarily evidence against the log Expectations Hypothesis, namely that long bond rates reflect expected short rates. 
Finally, Table B shows that the R 2 is quite small for i = 28, but increase to 15 − 20% at longer maturities. Residual autocorrelations for equations (15)-(18) are displayed in Chart 12. It seems fair to say that no serial correlation exists beyond lags 0, 2, 5, and 11 respectively for equations
(15)-(18).
The main question of this paper is whether the ability to predict changes in the Bank of England's two-week repo rate has changed over time. As said earlier, we employ two measures of evaluating the quality of market expectations, σ u and R 2 . Consequently, we will be looking for time variation, in the form of discrete shifts, in these two measures. (18) The coefficient of determination , R 2 , is determined by α, β, and σ u , so we will be looking for time variation in four distinct but related parameters: R 2 , α, β, and σ u .
To examine such time variation, we carry out three sets of tests. First, we re-estimate equations (15) -(18), but allow for a small number of exogenous shifts in (α, β) drawn from our earlier discussion of monetary policy in the United Kingdom (section 6.2). Second, in section 6.3., we explore time variation in predictability by visual tools in the form of rolling regressions. Finally, in section 6.4, we formally test for structural breaks in equations (15) -(18) without using any (17) We don't have any priors on α i when β i is statistically different from unity, so we only comment on the signs of α i when i = 182. (18) Gradual as opposed to discrete shifts in the performance of market expectations might be a more realistic assumption to make, based on the idea that eg. learning is a gradual process. However, we proceed with the hypothesis of discrete shifts, mainly due to technical reasons.
prior information on the location of potential breaks.
Estimation of market expectations with exogenous regime shifts
In this section, we re-estimate the market expectations from equations ( and twelve-month equations only. However, the null hypothesis will be rejected also for the three-month equation at a significance level of 10 %. Note that the Chow tests employed in Table   C do not test for breaks in σ , and hence they may lack power against alternatives where such breaks are taking place. whereas predictability appears to be at its lowest level between 1990 and 1992. For the one-month rate, however, such a rise in predictability is seen only after May 1997.
Second, the root-mean-squared-error of the market forecasts, as embodied in σ u , displays a decline over the period, with the lowest estimates observed since November 92. One could conjecture that this result is driven by the fact that volatility of the target rate has declined over time, see Table A and Chart 1. However the R 2 's, measuring the fraction of the total variance of changes in the short rate predicted by the yield spread, have increased as described above. In other words, the predicted variance of the short rate as a fraction of the total variance has increased over time. So the conjecture above seems to be rejected. The bottom line is that the declines in σ u ,
The variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is estimated by the Newey-West method as described in section 5.
observed in Table C , are consistent with a rise in predictability since 1992.
Third, as a robustness check, predictability as measured by the mean linlin loss criterion is also reported, see M L L 0.75 . The general picture is consistent with σ u and R 2 's: predictability has increased since 1992.
Fourth, when estimating equations (15) -(18) for the earlier sub-periods, we obtain mixed results.
Before 1980, the ability of the market expectations to predict policy rate changes is markedly lower than in the period after 1992 in the case of the three-, six-, and twelve-month rate, and after 1997 in the case of the one-month rate. After the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980, the markets' ability to predict policy rate changes increases at the twelve-month maturity, but falls at the one-, three-, and six-month maturities. This is visible in both the β i 's, the R 2 's, and the σ u .
As an aside, we re-estimated the market expectations with an additional break, April 1994 (the publication of minutes). While Chow tests confirm this to be a significant break, the regression results, see The results presented so far provide a first indication that changes in the UK monetary policy framework were associated with greater predictability in policy making. However, the regression results are not entirely consistent with such a strong conclusion. Increased predictability is not witnessed in all market rates. Moreover, the regression results fluctuate from one sub-period to another, and it is not clear that this is always an accurate reflection of monetary policy. Taken together, these observations point to some of the shortcomings of the chosen method. First, when imposing a small number of break points corresponding to policy changes, the researcher assumes that the policy change in question is immediately incorporated into market expectations. If in contrast, market participants take time to modify their views of central bank behavior, then we would expect to see a gradual adjustment in the behavior of market rates. Regressions that rely on a small number of discrete shifts would not be able to detect this. Second, our choice of four break points was clearly subjective, and we are at risk of having missed other, potentially relevant break dates. In the following two sections, we perform a more objective analysis in the sense that we disregard any prior information on potential break dates and let "data speak for themselves".
Finally, it is worth noting that the regressions of this section, as well as those of the following sections, assume parameter stability within each sub-sample.
Estimation of market expectations based on rolling regressions
In this section, we estimate equations (15)-(18) over moving windows of four and eight years.
Stable coefficient estimates would be associated with no changes in the parameters. Chart 6 displays the results graphically for the four year window for the one-month rate in row 1, the three-month rate in row 2, the six-month rate in row 3, and the twelve-month rate in the last row. For the one-month rate, both α 28 and β 28 look fairly stable and most of the time they are not significantly different from zero. Moving to the three-month, six-month and twelwe-month rates, α i 's and β i 's look fairly unstable. The movements in these parameter estimates are closely related in the sense that they seem to move together. When repeating this exercise with a moving window of eight year (Chart 7), the various parameter estimates are less volatile due to a larger window width but the general impression obtained from Chart 6 continues to hold.
At first sight, Charts 6 and 7 suggest that equations (15)-(18) may be subject to structural changes.
In particular the β coefficients appear more variable during the 1980's and early 1990's. At a first sight, this seems to point to a structural break in the early 1990s, and would be consistent with the results of the previous section. But, rolling regressions should only be considered as rough visual tools to locate structural breaks. Rigorous identification of structural breaks will be carried out in 
Estimation of market expectations based on the Bai-Perron methodology
In this section, we carry out a more rigorous analysis of time variation in predictability by employing the methodology of Jushan Bai and Pierre Perron. The core theory is described Bai and 
Breakpoint methodology
The modelling framework is a generalization of equation (12), allowing for breaks in the parameters c n,t = β n, j s n,t + α n, j + u n,t for t = T j−1 + 1, ..., T j and
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks. So (β n,1 , α n,1 ) correspond to the parameters for the first segment [0 : T 1 ], (β n,2 , α n,2 ) correspond to the parameters for the second segment [T 1 + 1 : T 2 ], etc. The aim of this section is to estimate {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T m } and the associated parameters (β n, j , α n, j ) for j = 1, 2, .., k
We have chosen the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998) primarily due to three unique features.
In particular, it allows for
• Multiple structural changes.
• General forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors.
• Different distributions for the errors and the regressors across segments.
Allowing for multiple structural changes is crucial because there are several potential break dates over the sample period. (23) The reasons mentioned in the last two bullet points are important because shifts in the ability to anticipate interest rate changes are likely to be associated with other shifts in the parameters of the model, in particular the variance of the error term.
A detailed description of the methodology and its implementation is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we provide a brief introduction to the implementation of the tests.
Broadly speaking, all tests consist of estimating equation (19) repeatedly with all combinations of breakpoints {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T m } and choosing the set of breakpoints that minimise the sum of squared residuals. There are three categories of tests, all using this same basic idea:
(23) See the discussion in section 2.
(24) Technical details of the analysis which would allow the reader to replicate our results are available upon request.
• Test 1: Test of no break versus a fixed number of breaks (l) Selection of l will be clarified below.
• Test 2: Test of no structural break versus an unknown number of breaks bounded from above by M.
No breaks H A : Number breaks between 1 and M.
As in Test 1, a sequence of F-statistics are computed and combined into a summary F-test statistic. In turn, these are put together, using some fixed weights determined by the researcher.
Hence, the name 'double maximum.' Following default settings in the software related to Bai (a%) . For more detailed information, the reader is referred to section 4.2 of Bai and Perron (1998).
• Test 3: Test of l breaks against the alternative of one additional break (l + 1)
To conduct this test, (19) is estimated sequentially for increasing l, with the summary test statistic denoted by SupF T (l + 1|l). The test rejects for large values of SupF T (l + 1|l) and is derived in section 4.3 of Bai and Perron (1998). Clearly, Test 1 and Test 3 intersect for l = 0.
Having defined the various statistical tests used to identify breakpoints, T m in (19), we now describe the actual implementation. The question is: how should we combine Tests 1, 2 and 3 to estimate the number of breakpoints m and the associated locations {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T m } ?
(25) This test should have higher power compared to U Dmax in the presence of a large number of breaks.
The recommended estimation strategy of Bai and Perron (1998) , denoted by the sequential procedure, is to start by setting l to a small number of breaks (typically zero). This procedure then tests sequentially the null of l breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of l + 1 breaks by applying SupF T (l + 1|l) (Test 3) sequentially from l = 0 (i.e. Test 1) until the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no additional breakpoints. However, in a simulation study,Bai and Perron (2001) highlight a potential shortcoming of this procedure. In particular, in the presence of multiple breaks, mechanical application of the above mentioned strategy may be sub-optimal in the sense that the selected number of breaks tends to be too low.
For this reason, Bai and Perron (2001) 
We report the results of both procedures but attach most weight to the preferred procedure following Bai and Perron (2001) 
Breakpoint results
Tables E, F, G and H present empirical results for equations (15), (16), (17), (18), respectively.
The first section of the tables, Specification, defines the model. Note that T i denotes the end point (26) The reason being that if eg two breaks are present, the first test in the sequential procedure F T (1|0) tends to accept the null of no breaks.
(27) The selection of a suitable choice of l is not specified in Bai and Perron (2001) , so the selection process outlined above is our invention. Jan 1994-) . The results for the six-and twelve-month rates in Tables G and H are similar in the sense that both the sequential and the preferred procedure indicate no breakpoints.
Confidence intervals for the breakpoints are wide in Tables E to H and typically cover several years. In other words, the point estimates are associated with a large degree of uncertainty. When allowing for these margins of errors, it might, however, be easier to see the economic relevance of the estimated breakpoints. The first breakpoint, January 1980, comes a few months before the announcement of the MTFS. As explained earlier, the MTFS was at the time viewed as an critical improvement on previous policies. The second break point, March 1984, is more difficult to explain, even when taking into account its confidence interval (which is so wide in the case of the three-month rate that it includes the first breakpoint). October 1989 comes up as a third breakpoint, but only in the three-month regression. That month saw one of the larger policy rate (30) The idea of the sequential procedure is to test sequentially the null of n breaks vs the alternative hypothesis of n + 1 breaks, starting from n = 0. So the first test to consider is the test of zero breaks vs one break: It is also interesting to note that on the whole, the data do not select the earlier-used exogenous breakpoints. This could be interpreted in two, not necessarily competing ways. First, as suggested in section 2, there may be multiple structural breaks in the regression equations. In this case, the power properties of the Bai Perron methodology are unknown, because a maximum of two breaks is considered in Bai and Perron (2001) . The methodology may very well have low power against the alternative of multiple breaks. Second, the simulation study by Bai and Perron (2001) , shows that serial correlation in the error term induces a loss of power in detecting breaks.
Combining this with the fact that the preferred procedure estimates 2, 4, 0 and 0 breakpoints, respectively for equations (15) -(18), one could hypothesize that failure to detect breaks in the sixand twelwe-month equations, (17) -(18), is due to the presence of strong residual autocorrelation in these equations.
Specification tests
The purpose of this section is to explore whether the models of interest rate expectations in equations (15) -(18) are well specified, in the sense that the statistical restrictions implied by the models are reflected in the data. In particular, we focus on two restrictions:
• Restriction on serial correlation of error term. Serial correlation is allowed up to lag orders of 0, 2, 5 and 11 for equations (15) -(18) respectively, see section 5.
• Zero coefficients on lagged changes in the Bank of England two-week repo rate in the regressions (15) -(18).
Autocorrelation functions for equations (15) -(18) are displayed graphically in Chart 12. It seems fair to say that the restriction on residual autocorrelation in the form of maximum lag orders of 0, 2, 5 and 11 is fulfilled.
The second restriction is a special case of the more general restriction that the spread s t contains all relevant information about market expectations. Therefore any additional current (and lagged) variables in (12) should be insignificant. A good candidate for a variable with potential explanatory power in equation (12) is the change in the Bank of England's two-week repo rate.
Chart 1 clearly indicates that changes in the policy rate are highly persistent in the sense that increases/decreases tend to be followed by increases/decreases. Therefore, we estimate the following regressions , allowing for changes in dynamics corresponding to the exogenous breaks identified in section 6.2. 
Concluding remarks
Our prior when embarking on this project was that increased stability in policy rate setting (as evidenced in Table A) , together with increased transparency of monetary policy decision making would have contributed to increased ability of market interest rates to predict future policy rate changes. In particular, following recent US evidence, we were interested in identifying structural breaks in the relationship between market and policy rates following key changes in the monetary policy framework of the United Kingdom. Our evidence on such structural change has proved very mixed.
First, we find that in the context of a simple expectations model, exogenous breakpoints corresponding to key policy changes are indeed significant. Moreover, we find that predictability has improved over time, with the expectations model providing a decidedly better fit after the introduction of inflation targeting in October1992.
But closer examination of the data reveals that things are not that clear-cut. First, when examining different maturities, we see that the results do no always generalise. For example, predictability from the shortest rates did not increase markedly until after May 1997. Second, our tests showed that while predictability did indeed change over time, these changes were not necessarily concentrated around the exogenous breakpoints suggested by the history of policy reforms.
Instead, predictability varied widely across the sample period and across maturities. For example, at the longest horizon, it rose briefly after the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980 and plummeted after sterling's exit from the ERM in October 1990. Rolling regressions show that in the 1980s and early 1990s predictability fluctuated between 0 and 60%, with frequent highs and lows seemingly unrelated to any policy changes. Attempts to identify structural breakpoints in a formal way were on the whole unsuccessful. Nonetheless, over the longer sample period , the data show a clear improvement in the ability of market rates to anticipate policy changes. In this table we focus on the significance of the φ-coefficients. The null of φ = 0 is tested for each φ-coefficient, and a rejection of this hypothesis at a one/five significance level is denoted by **/*, respectively. Standard errors are estimated by the Newey-West method allowing for serial correlation up to lag order 0, 2, 5, and 11 for the equations. Note: Autocorrelations significantly different from zero (using asymptotic standard errors) at a 5 % significance level are shaded.
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